YB new stock pitches (Fri, Aug 14)

The Oncology Institute (STLN, formerly TOI, now Starling), the author's biggest position and a significant driver of YTD performance, is a community cancer care company that uniquely owns its own pharmacy, allowing it to capture the drug margin—unlike Evolent, which takes drug-cost risk without owning dispensing. The core insight is that a capitated cancer patient isn't profitable on the capitation rate itself but on the prescriptions filled through Starling's pharmacy, so each capitated life is effectively an acquisition of future pharmacy volume; as scripts per patient cohort ramp from roughly 1.0 to 3.2, gross profit per thousand lives climbs about 68% with no rate increase. The company just posted its first-ever positive adjusted EBITDA (~$0.2M) on revenue up 35% and specialty pharmacy up 58%, while the July OrbiMed refinancing de-risked the balance sheet. The path forward involves adjusted EBITDA rising from ~0 to a normalized ~5–6% of revenue (~$35M) as operating leverage plays out, SG&A falling from 19% (already down ~30%) toward the mid-teens, and the pharmacy-to-capitation flywheel extending beyond Florida into new Nevada, Oregon, and California contracts. The author sees a path to $1bn revenue with 6–8% margins over the next couple of years, and at 15x–20x EBITDA, believes the stock is still a double from here.

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VNV Global (VNV.ST) is a Stockholm-listed venture capital holding company (formerly Vostok Nafta, founded 1996) trading at SEK 16.6 versus reported NAV of SEK 34.97 per share—a ~53% discount near its widest historical level—with a ~SEK 2.1 billion (~USD 220 million) market cap against a portfolio marked at USD 484 million, and the author holds it as a small position. Its historic wins include Avito (34x, 37% IRR), Tinkoff (8x, 42%), and Hemnet (8x, 50%), but it suffered badly in 2021–2023 with Babylon Health, Swvl, and the Russian book all going to zero, diluting shareholders through raises and dropping NAV/share from a ~SEK 120–130 peak; long-run NAV IRR since 2012 is now ~11.8% versus a prior 25%+. The thesis is that the six-company European portfolio (51% mobility, 27% marketplaces, 11% digital health) grew pro-rata revenue 32% to USD 130.4 million in 2025 and crossed from minus USD 5.9 million to plus USD 3.6 million adjusted EBITDA, and that marks are conservative—BlaBlaCar (25% of NAV, USD 121M, 13.5% owned; 150M passengers, ~EUR 2B GMV, EBITDA-positive, margin stepping from ~50% to 90%+ as it winds down operated buses) is carried at ~half its ~USD 2B 2024 round, while Voi (22% of NAV, USD 106M, 20.8% owned; EUR 188.3M net revenue LTM, 15.8% EBITDA margin, 38% growth) is marked around USD 0.5B versus slower, loss-making Lime's USD 1.66B July 2026 Nasdaq listing; other holdings include HousingAnywhere (8%), Numan (7%), Breadfast (6%), and Bokadirekt (5%), and third parties (Flo, Oura/Veristable at USD 10.9B, Tise sold to eBay at a 65% premium) have transacted above VNV's marks. Management (Per Brilioth ~20 years, CFO Björn von Sivers, ~7 employees, ~1.9% of NAV opex) is aligned via personal share purchases—including new chairman Lars-Åke Norling's ~SEK 3M buy—and is cutting debt (borrowings from USD 46M to USD 27.1M via a SEK 166.9M bond buyback at 104%), repurchasing 2.97M shares (~2.3%) over the trailing year, and building a regulated fund structure ('VNV 2.0') with details due at the 16 September 2026 Capital Markets Day. Valuation on NAV: base case ~SEK 55 (15% portfolio compounding plus buyback accretion) implies ~30% annual returns, while a bull case assuming the discount fully closes yields ~49% annually (over 3x); flat NAV with unchanged discount is roughly break-even, offering downside asymmetry. Risks include a thin own-moat, mark credibility scars, model-based marks that lag public comps (NAV fell 16% in H1 2026 on multiple compression despite operating growth), concentration (top six are 78% of NAV, BlaBlaCar and Voi 47%), no major exits expected from the core in 2026, low liquidity, currency mismatch (USD-reported NAV, SEK-traded, euro/GBP/EGP earnings), regulatory/political exposure (Paris banned scooters in 2023), AI-driven capital concentration suppressing peer valuations, and the risk the discount simply persists; catalysts are a potential BlaBlaCar IPO (likely Euronext Paris), a Voi exit, continued buybacks, and the fund structure, with Q3 results due 27 October 2026.

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ZenaTech (NASDAQ: ZENA), a self-described drone software company and serial acquirer ('roll-up') that does not hold earnings calls and has lost over $20M per quarter for the past two quarters, is a short flagged by White Diamond for related-party self-dealing by CEO Dr. Shaun Passley. Passley also controls Epazz (OTC: EPAZ), a tiny OTC company with just a $340K market cap, which conducts R&D for ZENA under a 20-year management services agreement whereby ZENA first advances cash for development and then buys the resulting technology back—forcing shareholders to pay twice. ZENA advanced approximately C$28.2M in cash to EPAZ (as of March 31, 2026: $12.19M short-term, $16.04M long-term per its Q126 SEC filing), and EPAZ then sold the developed drone technology assets—carried at an unamortized book value of only US$2,356,495.77—back to ZENA for US$46,498,653.23 in ZENA equity securities, roughly 19x book value, with no valuator, fairness opinion, or third party involved (the board priced it on 'an internal determination of their value' and 'did not review the agreement with its legal counsel'). Additionally, ZENA's balance sheet carries C$86,310,000 of preferred stock (up from C$51,810,000 at year end), equating to 28,770,000 preferred shares at the C$3.00 stated value, each convertible into three common shares—creating ~86M hidden common-equivalent dilution on top of the 88,884,193 common shares reported in July, a dilution not reflected on sites like dilutiontracker.com, meaning market-cap-based valuations understate the real share count by roughly half. White Diamond does not allege fraud, noting ZENA's surveying acquisitions are real and bought from unrelated sellers and that independent directors unanimously approved the deal, but emphasizes there was no independent market valuation of the transferred assets, with the same man (Passley) effectively signing for both buyer and seller.

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